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Abstract—The problem of multilevel diversity coding with
secure regeneration is revisited. Under the assumption that the
eavesdropper can access the repair data for all compromised stor-
age nodes, Shao el al. provided a precise characterization of the
minimum-bandwidth-regeneration (MBR) point of the achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region. In
this paper, it is shown that the MBR point of the achievable
normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region
remains the same even if we assume that the eavesdropper
can access the repair data for some compromised storage nodes
(type II compromised nodes) but only the data contents of the
remaining compromised nodes (type I compromised nodes), as
long as the number of type I compromised nodes is no greater
than that of type II compromised nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity coding, node repair, and security are three basic
ingredients of modern distributed storage systems. The inter-
play of all three ingredients is captured by a fairly general
mathematical model known multilevel diversity coding with
secure regeneration (MDC-SR) [1].
More specifically, in an (n, d, `) MDC-SR problem, a total
of d− ` independent files M`+1, . . . ,Md of size B`+1, . . . , Bd,
respectively, are to be encoded and stored in n distributed
storage nodes, each of capacity α. The encoding needs to
ensure that:
• (Diversity coding) the file Mj can be perfectly recovered
by having full access to any j out of the total n storage
nodes for any j ∈ {`+ 1, . . . , d};
• (Node repair) when node failures occur and there are d
remaining nodes in the system, any failed node can be
recovered by downloading data of size β from each one
of the remaining nodes;
• (Security) the files M`+1, . . . ,Md needs to be kept
information-theoretically secure against an eavesdropper,
which can access the repair data for ` compromised
storage nodes.
Setting ` = 0, the above problem reduces to the problem
of multilevel diversity coding with regeneration (MDC-R)
considered in [2], [3]. Setting Bj = 0 for all j 6= k, the
above problem reduces to the (n, k, d, `) secure regenerating
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code (SRC) problem considered in [4]–[11]. The goal is to
understand the optimal tradeoffs between the storage capacity
and repair bandwidth in satisfying all three aforementioned
requirements.
From the code construction perspective, it is natural to con-
sider the so-called separate coding scheme, i.e., to construct a
code for the (n, d, `) MDC-SR problem, we can simply use an
(n, j, d, `) SRC to encode the file Mj for each j ∈ {`+1, . . . , d},
and the coded messages for each file remain separate when
stored in the storage nodes and during the repair processes.
However, despite being a natural scheme, it was shown in [2]
that separate coding is in general suboptimal in achieving the
optimal tradeoffs between the normalized storage-capacity and
repair-bandwidth for the MDC-R problem (which is a special
case of the MDC-SR problem as mentioned previously). On
the other hand, it has been shown [1] that separate coding can,
in fact, achieve the minimum-bandwidth-regenerating (MBR)
point of the achievable normalized storage-capacity and repair-
bandwidth tradeoff region for the general MDC-SR problem.
Nevertheless, the optimal tradeoffs between the storage ca-
pacity α and download bandwidth β, and, the performance
of the minimum-storage-regenerating (MSR) point are still not
fully understood. Especially for the MSR point, a code was
given in [6] for SRC problem by extending the known MSR
code without any security constraint. This coding scheme can
achieve the MSR point when d ≥ 2k− 2 and the eavesdropper
can only observe type I compromised nodes (the definition
of type I compromised node will be defined in the following
part). However, it is still unknown as to whether this code is
optimal for the more general eavesdropper model in our paper.
In this paper, we shall revisit the MDC-SR problem with a
more general eavesdropping model. More specifically, instead
of assuming that the eavesdropper can access the repair data
for all compromised storage nodes, we shall assume that
the compromised storage nodes can be divided into two
different categories: type I compromised nodes and type II
compromised nodes. While for the type II compromised nodes,
we assume that the eavesdropper can access the repair data as
before, for the type I compromised nodes we assume that the
eavesdropper can only access the stored data contents.
Let `1 and `2 be the number of type I compromised nodes
and type II compromised nodes respectively, and ` := `1 + `2
be the total number of compromised nodes. By the node repair
requirement, the data contents stored at any node can be fully
recovered from its repair data. Therefore, for any fixed `, the
eavesdropper becomes weaker as `1 increases, which leads to a
potentially larger achievable normalized storage-capacity and
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region. A question of fundamental
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2interest is to understand whether increasing `1 can lead to
a strictly larger achievable normalized storage-capacity and
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region. Our main result of the paper
is to show that the MBR point of the achievable normalized
storage-capacity and repair-bandwidth tradeoff region remains
the same, as long as `1 ≤ `/2 (or equivalently, `1 ≤ `2 by the
fact that `2 = ` − `1). From the technical viewpoint, this is
mainly accomplished by establishing two outer bounds (one
of them must be “horizontal”, i.e., on the normalized repair-
bandwidth only) on the achievable normalized storage-capacity
and repair-bandwidth tradeoff region, which intersect precisely
at the MBR point.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we formally introduce the problem of MDC-SR with the
generalized eavesdropping model. The main results of the
paper are then presented in Section III. In Section IV, we
introduce two “exchange” lemmas and use them to establish
the main results of the paper. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section V.
Notation. Sets and random variables will be written in
calligraphic and sans-serif fonts respectively, to differentiate
from the real numbers written in normal math fonts. For any
two integers t ≤ t′, we shall denote the set of consecutive
integers {t, t+1, . . . , t′} by [t : t′]. The use of the brackets will
be suppressed otherwise.
II. THE GENERALIZED MDC-SR PROBLEM
In this paper, we study a distributed storage system that
share the same file recovery and node repair function with [1].
Let (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd,K, T, S) be a tuple of positive integers
such that d < n. Formally, an (n, d,N1, . . . , Nd,K, T, S) code
consists of:
• for each i ∈ [1 : n], a message-encoding function fi :(∏d
j=1[1 : Nj ]
)
× [1 : K]→ [1 : T ];
• for each A ⊆ [1 : n] : |A| ∈ [1 : d], a message-decoding
function gA : [1 : T ]|A| → [1 : N|A|];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d, i′ ∈ B, and i ∈ [1 : n] \ B, a
repair-encoding function fBi′→i : [1 : T ]→ [1 : S];
• for each B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d and i ∈ [1 : n] \ B, a
repair-decoding function gBi : [1 : S]d → [1 : T ].
For each j ∈ [1 : d], let Mj be a message that is uniformly
distributed over [1 : Nj ]. The messages M1, . . . ,Md are
assumed to be mutually independent. Let K be a random key
that is uniformly distributed over [1 : K] and independent
of the messages (M1, . . . ,Md). For each i ∈ [1 : n], let
Wi = fi(M1, . . . ,Md,K) be the data stored at the ith storage
node, and for each B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d, i′ ∈ B, and
i ∈ [1 : n] \ B, let SBi′→i = fBi′→i(Wi′) be the data downloaded
from the i′th storage node in order to regenerate the data
originally stored at the ith storage node under the context of
repair group B. Obviously,
(Bj = logNj : j ∈ [1 : d]), α = log T, and β = logS
represent the message sizes, storage capacity, and repair band-
width, respectively.
The main deference between our definition in this paper
and that in [1] is the model of eavesdropper. The eavesdrop-
per now can observer a more complicated data combination
consisted of both stored content and repair content.Let `1
and `2 be two nonnegative integers such that ` := `1 +
`2 < d. A normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tuple (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) is said to be achiev-
able for the (n, d, `1, `2) generalized MDC-SR problem if an
(n, d, 1, . . . , 1, N`+1, . . . , Nd,K, T, S) code (i.e., Nj = 1 for all
j ∈ [1 : `]) can be found such that:
• (rate normalization)
α∑d
t=`+1Bt
= α¯,
β∑d
t=`+1Bt
= β¯,
Bj∑d
t=`+1Bt
= B¯j
(1)
for any j ∈ [`+ 1 : d];
• (message recovery)
M|A| = gA(Wi : i ∈ A) (2)
for any A ⊆ [1 : n] : |A| ∈ [`+ 1 : d];
• (node regeneration)
Wi = g
B
i (S
B
i′→i : i
′ ∈ B) (3)
for any B ⊆ [1 : n] : |B| = d and i ∈ [1 : n] \ B;
• (repair secrecy)
I((M`+1, . . . ,Md); (Wi : i ∈ E1), (S→j : j ∈ E2)) = 0 (4)
for any E1, E2 ⊆ [1 : n] such that |E1| = `1, |E2| = `2 and
E1∩E2 = ∅ (so E1 and E2 represent the sets of type I and
type II compromised storage nodes, respectively), where
S→i := (SBi′→i : B ⊆ [1 : n], |B| = d, B 63 i, i′ ∈ B) is the
collection of data that can be downloaded from the other
nodes to regenerate node i.
The closure of all achievable (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) tuples is the
achievable normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tradeoff region Rn,d,`1,`2 for the (n, d, `1, `2) gen-
eralized MDC-SR problem. For a fixed normalized message-
rate tuple (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d), the achievable normalized storage-
capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region is the collection of
all normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pairs (α¯, β¯)
such that (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,d,`1`2 and is denoted byRn,d,`1,`2 (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d).
Fixing ` and setting `1 = 0, the (n, d, `1, `2) generalized
MDC-SR problem reduces to the (n, d, `) MDC-SR problem
considered previously in [1], where it was shown that any
achievable normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tuple (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,d,` must satisfy:
β¯ ≥
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j (5)
and α¯+ (d(d− `)− `)β¯ ≥ (d− `)(d+ 1)
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j .
(6)
When set as equalities, the intersection of (5) and (6) is given
3by:
(
α¯, β¯
)
=
d d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j ,
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j
 (7)
which can be achieved by separate encoding with a previous
scheme proposed by Shah, Rashmi, and Kumar [6]. This
provides a precise characterization of the MBR point for the
(n, d, `) MDC-SR problem.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our main result of the paper is to show that the tradeoff
point (7) remains to be the MBR point of Rn,d,`1,`2 for the
generalized MDC-SR problem as long as `1 ≤ `2. The results
are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the generalized MDC-SR problem, any
achievable normalized message-rate storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tuple (B¯`+1, . . . , B¯d, α¯, β¯) ∈ Rn,d,`1,`2 must sat-
isfy:
β¯ ≥
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j (8)
and in addition, when `1 ≤ `2 = `− `1, we also have
α¯+ Td,d,`1+1β¯ ≥ (Td,d,`1 + `1)
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j (9)
where Td,k,` :=
∑k
t=`+1(d + 1 − t). When set as equalities,
the intersection of (8) and (9) is precisely given by (7). We
may thus conclude immediately that (7) is the MBR point of
Rn,d,`1,`2 for the generalized MDC-SR problem as long as
`1 ≤ `2.
Note that setting `1 = 0, the outer bound (9) reduces to
α¯+
d(d− 1)
2
β¯ ≥ d(d+ 1)
2
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`B¯j . (10)
So while the outer bound (8) coincides with (5), the outer
bound (9) does not reduce to (6) when setting `1 = 0. Simple
calculations yield that the outer bound (10) is stronger than
(6) if and only if ` ≤ d/2. In particular, when ` = 0, the outer
bound (10) reduces to that for the (n, d) MDC-R problem [3],
while the outer bound (6) is strictly weaker. Fig. 1 shows the
comparison of (10) and (6) when (B¯1, B¯2, B¯3) = (0, 1/3, 2/3)
in (4, 3, 0, 0) MDC-SR problem. In this figure, the outer bound
(6) is below outer bound (10), though both of them intersect
with (8) at the MBR point.
IV. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULTS
Let us first outline the main ingredients for proving the outer
bounds (8) and (9).
1) Total number of nodes. To prove the outer bounds (8) and
(9), let us first note that these bounds are independent
of the total number of storage nodes n in the system.
Therefore, in our proof, we only need to consider the
cases where n = d + 1. For the cases where n > d + 1,
since any subsystem consisting of d + 1 out of the total
n storage nodes must give rise to a (d + 1, d, `) MDC-
SR problem. Therefore, these outer bounds must apply
Fig. 1. The optimal tradeoff region for (4, 3, 0, 0) MDC-SR problem when
(B¯1, B¯2, B¯3) = (0, 1/3, 2/3) . The outer bounds (8), (10) and (6) are
evaluated as β¯ ≥ 8/45, α¯ + 3β¯ ≥ 16/15, and α¯ + 9β¯ ≥ 32/15,
respectively. When set as equalities, they intersect precisely at the MBR point
(8/15, 8/45).
as well. When n = d + 1, any repair group B of size d
is uniquely determined by the node j to be repaired, i.e.,
B = [1 : n] \ {j}, and hence can be dropped from the
notation SBi→j without causing any confusion.
2) Code symmetry. Due to the built-in symmetry of the
problem, to prove the outer bounds (8) and (9), we only
need to consider the so-called symmetrical codes [12] for
which the joint entropy of any subset of random variables
from
((M1, . . . ,Md),K,
(Wi : i ∈ [1 : n]), (Si→j : i, j ∈ [1 : n], i 6= j)
)
remains unchanged under any permutation over the
storage-node indices.
3) Key collections of random variables. Focusing on the
symmetrical (n = d+ 1, d,N1, . . . , Nd,K, T, S) codes, the
following collections of random variables play a key role
in our proof:
MA := (Mi : i ∈ A), A ⊆ [1 : d]
M(m) := M[1:m], m ∈ [1 : d]
WA := (Wi : i ∈ A) , A ⊆ [1 : n]
Si→B :=
(
Si→j : j ∈ B
)
, i ∈ [1 : n], B ⊆ [1 : n] \ {i}
SB→j :=
(
Si→j : i ∈ B
)
, j ∈ [1 : n], B ⊆ [1 : n] \ {j}
S→j := S[1:j−1]∪[j+1:n]→j , j ∈ [1 : n]
S→B :=
(
S→j : j ∈ B
)
, B ⊆ [1 : n]
S→j := S[1:j−1]→j , j ∈ [1 : n]
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B), B ⊆ [1 : n]
S→j := S[j+1:n]→j , j ∈ [1 : n]
S→B := (S→j : j ∈ B), B ⊆ [1 : n]
U(t,s) := (W[1:t], S→[t+1:s]), s ∈ [1 : n], t ∈ [0 : s]
U(s) := U(0,s).
These collections of random variables have also been
used in [3], [11].
An important part of the proof is to understand the relations
between the collections of random variables defined above, and
to use them to derive the desired converse results. We shall
discuss this next.
4A. Technical Lemmas
Lemma 1: For any (n = d + 1, d,N1, . . . , Nd,K, T, S)
code that satisfies the node regeneration requirement (3),
(S→[t+1:s],W[t+1:s]) is a function of U(t,s) for any s ∈ [1 : n]
and t ∈ [0 : s− 1].
The above lemma, which was first introduced in [1], [11],
demonstrates the “compactness” of U(t,s) and has a number of
direct consequences. For example, for any fixed s ∈ [1 : n], it
is clear from Lemma 1 that U(t2,s) is a function of U(t1,s) and
hence H(U(t2,s)) ≤ H(U(t1,s)) for any 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ s− 1.
Lemma 2 (Exchange lemma I [1]): For any symmetrical
(n = d+ 1, d,N1, . . . , Nd, K,T, S) code that satisfies the node
regeneration requirement (3), we have
d+ 1− j
d−m H(U
(i,m)|M(m)) +H(U(i′,j)|M(m))
≥ d+ 1− j
d−m H(U
(i,m+1)|M(m)) +H(U(i′,j−1)|M(m))
(11)
for any m ∈ [1 : d − 1], i ∈ [0 : m − 1], i′ ∈ [0 : i], and
j ∈ [i′ + 1 : m− i+ i′ + 1].
Corollary 3: For any symmetrical (n = d+ 1, d,N1, . . . , Nd,
K,T, S) code that satisfies the node regeneration requirement
(3), we have
Td,j1,j2
d− j1
H(U(i,j1)|M(j1)) +H(U(i′,j1)|M(j1))
≥ Td,j1,j2
d− j1
H(U(i,j1+1)|M(j1)) +H(U(i′,j2)|M(j1)) (12)
for any j1 ∈ [1 : d− 1], i = [0 : j1], i′ ∈ [max{0, i− 1} : i] and
j2 ∈ [i′ : j1 − 1].
Proof: Set m = j1 in (11). We have
d+ 1− j
d− j1
H(U(i,j1)|M(j1)) +H(U(i′,j)|M(j1))
≥ d+ 1− j
d− j1
H(U(i,j1+1)|M(j1)) +H(U(i′,j−1)|M(j1))
(13)
for any j ∈ [j2+1 : j1]. Add the inequalities (13) for j ∈ [j2+1 :
j1] and cancel the common term
∑j1−1
j=j2+1
H(U(i
′,j)|M(j1))
from both sides. We have
Td,j1,j2
d− j1
H(U(i,j1)|M(j1)) +H(U(i′,j1)|M(j1))
≥ Td,j1,j2
d− j1
H(U(i,j1+1)|M(j1)) +H(U(i′,j2)|M(j1)).
Corollary 4: For any symmetrical (n = d+ 1, d,N1, . . . , Nd,
K,T, S) code that satisfies the node regeneration requirement
(3), we have
T−1d,m,`H(U
(`1,m)|M(m)) ≥ T−1d,m+1,`H(U
(`1,m+1)|M(m))+
(T−1d,m,` − T
−1
d,m+1,`)H(U
(`1,`)|M(m))
(14)
for any ` ∈ [0 : d− 1], `1 ∈ [0 : `] and m ∈ [`+ 1 : d− 1].
Proof: Set i = i′ = `1, j1 = m and j2 = ` in (12). We
have
Td,m,`
d−mH(U
(`1,m)|M(m)) +H(U(`1,m)|M(m))
≥ Td,m,`
d−mH(U
(`1,m+1)|M(m)) +H(U(`1,`)|M(m)), (15)
which can be equivalently written as
Td,m+1,`
d−m H(U
(`1,m)|M(m))
≥ Td,m,`
d−mH(U
(`1,m+1)|M(m)) +H(U(`1,`)|M(m))
(16)
by the fact that Td,m,`+(d−m) = Td,m+1,`. Multiplying both
sides of (16) by
d−m
Td,m+1,`Td,m,`
= T−1d,m,` − T
−1
d,m+1,`
completes the proof of (12).
Lemma 5 (exchange lemma II): For any symmetrical (n =
d + 1, d,N1, . . . , Nd,K, T, S) code that satisfies the node
regeneration requirement (3), we have
d− `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1), S`1+1→[1:`1])
≥ d− `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1)) +H(U(`1,`1), S`1+1→[1:`1]) (17)
for any ` ∈ [1 : d− 1] and `1 ∈ [0 : b`/2c].
Proof: See the Appendix.
We note here that when setting `1 = 0, the above lemma
coincides with Lemma 2 with i = i′ = 0 and j = 1.
B. The Proof
Consider a symmetrical (n = d+1, d, 1, . . . , 1, N`+1, . . . , Nd,
K,T, S) regenerating code that satisfies the rate normalization
requirement (1), the message recovery requirement (2), the
node regeneration requirement (3), and the repair secrecy
requirement (4). Let us first prove a few intermediate results.
The outer bounds (8) and (9) will then follow immediately.
Proposition 1:
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1)) ≥
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj+
T−1d,m,`H(U
(`1,m)|M[`+1:m]) +
(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
(18)
for any m ∈ [`+ 1 : d]. Consequently,
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1)) ≥
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`)).
(19)
Proof: To see (18), consider proof by induction. For the
base case with m = `+ 1, we have
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1))
(a)
=
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1),M`+1)
(b)
=
1
d− `
(
H(M`+1) +H(U
(`1,`+1)|M`+1)
)
(c)
=
1
d− `
(
B`+1 +H(U
(`1,`+1)|M`+1)
)
(d)
= T−1d,`+1,`B`+1 + T
−1
d,`+1,`H(U
(`1,`+1)|M`+1)
5where (a) follows from the fact that M`+1 is a function of
W[1:`+1], which is a function of U
(`1,`+1) by Lemma 1; (b)
follows from the chain rule for entropy; (c) follows from the
fact that H(M`+1) = B`+1; and (d) follows from the fact that
Td,`+1,` = d − `. Assuming that (18) holds for some m ∈
[`+ 1 : d− 1], we have
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1))
(a)
≥
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj + T
−1
d,m,`H(U
(`1,m)|M[`+1:m])+(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
(b)
≥
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj + T
−1
d,m+1,`H(U
(`1,m+1)|M[`+1:m])+(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m+1,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
(c)
≥
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj+
T−1d,m+1,`H(U
(`1,m+1),Mm+1|M[`+1:m])+(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m+1,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
(d)
=
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj + T
−1
d,m+1,`H(Mm+1|M[`+1:m])+
T−1d,m+1,`H(U
(`1,m+1)|M[`+1:m+1])+(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m+1,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
(e)
=
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj + T
−1
d,m+1,`Bm+1+
T−1d,m+1,`H(U
(`1,m+1)|M[`+1:m+1])+(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m+1,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
=
m+1∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,` + T
−1
d,m+1,`H(U
(`1,m+1)|M[`+1:m+1])+(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m+1,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
where (a) follows from the induction assumption; (b) follows
from Corollary 3; (c) follows from the fact that Mm+1 is a
function of W[1:m+1], which is is a function of U
(`1,m+1) by
Lemma 1; (d) follows from the chain rule for entropy; and (e)
follows from the facts that Mm+1 is independent of M[`+1:m]
and that H(Mm+1) = Bm+1. This completes the induction
step and hence the proof of (18).
To see (19), simply set m = d in (18). We have
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1)) ≥
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj+
T−1d,d,`H(U
(`1,d)|M[`+1:d]) +
(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,d,`
)
H(U(`1,`)).
(20)
Note that
H(U(`1,d)|M[`+1:d]) ≥ H(U(`1,`)|M[`+1:d]) = H(U(`1,`))
(21)
where the last equality follows from the fact that
I(U(`1,`);M[`+1:d]) = 0 by the repair secrecy requirement (4).
Substituting (21) into (20) completes the proof of (19).
Proposition 2:
H(S`1+1→[1:`1]) +
`1
d− `H(U
(`1,`)) ≥ `1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1)).
(22)
Proof: First note that for any m ∈ [1 : `2 + 1] and k ∈
[`+ 1 : d+ 1], we have
H(S`1+1→[1:m]) +H(U
(`1,`),S[`+2:k]→`+1)
(a)
= H(Sk+1→[`1+1:`1+m−1]∪{`+1})+
H(U(`1,`), S→[`1+1:`],S[`+2:k]→`+1)
(b)
≥ H(Sk+1→[`1+1:`1+m−1]) +H(U
(`1,`), S[`+2:k+1]→`+1)
(c)
= H(S`1+1→[1:m−1]) +H(U
(`1,`), S[`+2:k+1]→`+1) (23)
where (a) and (c) follow from the fact that
H(S`1+1→[1:m]) = H(Sk+1→[1:m−1]∪{`+1}) and
H(Sk+1→[1:m−1]) = H(S`1+1→[1:m−1]) due to the
symmetrical code that we consider, and (b) follows from
the submodularity of the entropy function. Add (23) over
m ∈ [1 : `1] and cancel
∑`1−1
m=1 H(Sd+1→[1:m]) from both
sides. We have
H(Sd+1→[1:`]) + `1H(U
(`1,`),S[`+2:k+1]→`+1) ≥
`1H(U
(`1,`),S[`+2:k+1]→`+1). (24)
Add (25) over k ∈ [` + 1 : d] and cancel∑d−1
k=`+1H(U
(`1,`), S[`+2:k+1]→`+1) from both sides.
We have
(d− `)H(Sd+1→[1:`]) + `1H(U(`1,`))
≥`1H(U(`1,`), S[`+2:d+1]→`+1)
=`1H(U
(`1,`+1)). (25)
Multiplying both sides by (d − `)−1 completes the proof of
(22)
Proposition 3:
H(U(`1+1,m)) +
d−m
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
≥ (d−m)
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +H(U
(`1+1,m+1)) +
d−m
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
(26)
for any m ∈ [`+ 1 : d− 1]. Consequently,
H(U(`1+1,`+1)) +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
≥ Td,d,`
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
Td,d,`
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)). (27)
Proof: To see (26), note that for any m ∈ [` + 1 : d − 1],
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H(U(`1+1,m)|M[`+1:m]) +
d−m
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(a)
≥ H(U(`1+1,m)|M[`+1:m])+
(d−m)
 m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj+ T
−1
d,m,`H(U
(`1,m)|M[`+1:m])
+
(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m,`
)
H(U(`1,`))
)
= H(U(`1+1,m)|M[`+1:m])+
(d−m)T−1d,m,`H(U
(`1,m)|M[`+1:m])+
(d−m)
 m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m,`
)
H(U(`1,`))

(b)
≥ H(U(`1+1,m+1)|M[`+1:m])+
(d−m)T−1d,m,`H(U
(`1,`)|M[`+1:m])+
(d−m)
 m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m,`
)
H(U(`1,`))

(c)
= H(U(`1+1,m+1)|M[`+1:m]) + (d−m)T−1d,m,`H(U
(`1,`))+
(d−m)
 m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
(
1
d− ` − T
−1
d,m,`
)
H(U(`1`))

= H(U(`1+1,m+1)|M[`+1:m]) + (d−m)
m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj+
d−m
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
where (a) follows from (18) of Proposition 1; (b) fol-
lows from Corollary 4; and (c) follows from the fact that
I(U(`1,`);M[`+1:m]) = 0 due to the repair secrecy requirement
(4). Adding H(M[`+1:m]) to both sides and using the facts that
H(U(`1+1,m)|M[`+1:m]) +H(M[`+1:m])
= H(U(`1+1,m),M[`+1:m])
(a)
= H(U(`1+1,m))
and that
H(U(`1+1,m+1)|M[`+1:m]) +H(M[`+1:m])
= H(U(`1+1,m+1),M[`+1:m])
(b)
= H(U(`1+1,m+1))
complete the proof of (26). Here, (a) and (b) are due to the
facts that M[`+1:m] is a function of W[1:m], which is a function
of both U(`1+1,m) and U(`1+1,m+1) by Lemma 1.
To see (27), add (26) over m ∈ [` + 1 : d − 1] and cancel∑d−1
m=`+2H(U
(`1+1,m)) from both sides of the inequality. We
have
H(U(`1+1,`+1)) +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
≥
d−1∑
m=`+1
(d−m) m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj
+
H(U(`1+1,d)) +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)).
(28)
Note that
d−1∑
m=`+1
(d−m) m∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj

=
d−1∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj
 d−1∑
m=j
(d−m)
 = d−1∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Td,d,jBj .
(29)
Furthermore,
H(U(`1+1,d))
(a)
= H(U(`1+1,d),M[`+1:d])
(b)
= H(U(`1+1,d)|M[`+1:d]) +H(M[`+1:d])
(c)
= H(U(`1+1,d)|M[`+1:d]) +
d∑
j=`+1
Bj
≥ H(U(`1,`)|M[`+1:d]) +
d∑
j=`+1
Bj
(d)
= H(U(`1,`)) +
d∑
j=`+1
Bj (30)
where (a) follows from the fact that M[`+1:d] is a function
of W[1:d], which is is a function of U
(`1+1,d) by Lemma 1;
(b) follows from the chain rule for entropy; (c) follows from
the fact that H(M[`+1:d]) =
∑d
j=`+1Bj ; and (d) follows from
the fact that I(U(`1,`);M[`+1:d]) = 0 due to the repair secrecy
requirement (4).
Substituting (29) and (30) into (28) gives:
H(U(`1+1,`+1)) +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
≥
d−1∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Td,d,jBj +
d∑
j=`+1
Bj+(
1 +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))
=
d−1∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`(Td,d,j + Td,j,`)Bj +Bd +
Td,d,`
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
(a)
= Td,d,`
d−1∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +Bd +
Td,d,`
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
= Td,d,`
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
Td,d,`
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
where (a) follows from the fact that Td,d,j + Td,j,` = Td,d,`.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
We are now ready to prove the outer bounds (8) and (9).
To prove (8), note that
β +
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`))
(a)
≥ 1
d− `
(
H(S→`+1) +H(U(`1,`))
)
(b)
≥ 1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1))
7(c)
≥
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
1
d− `H(U
(`1,`))
where (a) follows from the fact that H(S→`+1) ≤ (d − `)β;
(b) follows from the union bound on entropy; and (c) follows
from (19) of Proposition 1. Cancelling 1d−`H(U
(`1,`)) from
both sides of the inequality and normalizing both sides by∑d
t=`+1Bt complete the proof of (8).
To prove (9), note that
α+ Td,d,`1+1β +
`1 + Td,d,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
(a)
= α+ Td,d,`1+1β+(
`1
d− ` +
Td,`,`1+1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` +
d− `1
d− ` + 1
)
H(U(`1,`))
=
Td,`,`1+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)) +H(U(`1,`))+
α+ Td,d,`1+1β+(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` +
d− `1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))
(b)
≥ Td,`,`1+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1)) +H(U(`1,`1+1))+
α+ Td,d,`1+1β+(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` +
d− `1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))
=
d− `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1), S`1+1→[1:`1])+
α+ Td,d,`1+1β +
(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(c)
≥ d− `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1)) +H(U(`1,`1),S`1+1→[1:`1])+
α+ Td,d,`1+1β +
(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(d)
= α+H(U(`1,`1), S`1+1→[1:`1])+
Td,d,`1+1β +
(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(e)
≥ H(W`+1) +H(U(`1,`1), S`1+1→[1:`1])+
Td,d,`1+1β +
(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(f)
= H(W`+1,S`1+1→[1:`1]) +H(U
(`1,`1),S`1+1→[1:`1])+
Td,d,`1+1β +
(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(g)
≥ H(S`1+1→[1:`1]) +H(U
(`1+1,`1+1), S`1+1→[1:`1])+
Td,d,`1+1β +
(
`1
d− ` +
Td,d,`+1
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(h)
≥ H(S`1+1→[1:`1]) +
`1
d− `H(U
(`1,`))+
H(U(`1+1,`1+1)) + Td,d,`1+1β +
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))+
Td,`,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(i)
≥ `1
d− `H(U
(`1,`+1)) +H(U(`1+1,`1+1)) + Td,d,`1+1β
+
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)) +
Td,`,`1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(j)
= H(U(`1+1,`1+1)) + Td,`+1,`1+1β
+
Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)) + Td,d,`+1β+
Td,`,`1 + `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(k)
≥ H(U(`1+1,`+1)) + Td,d,`+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))+
Td,`,`1 + `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1))
(l)
≥ (Td,d,` + Td,`,`1 + `1)
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj+
Td,d,` + Td,`,`1 + `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
(m)
= (Td,d,`1 + `1)
d∑
j=`+1
T−1d,j,`Bj +
Td,d,`1 + `1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`))
where (a) follows from the fact that Td,`,`1+1 +Td,d,`+1 +d−
`1 + d− ` = Td,d,`1 ; (b) follows from Corollary 3 that
Td,`,`1+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`)) +H(U(`1,`)) ≥
Td,`,`1+1
d− ` H(U
(`1,`+1)) +H(U(`1,`1+1))
by setting j1 = `, j2 = `1 + 1 and i = i′ = `1 in 12; (c)
follows from (17) in Lemma 5; (d) follows from the fact
that Td,`,`1+1 + d − `1 = Td,`,`1 ; (e) follows from the fact
that H(W`+1) ≤ α; (f) and (h) follows from the fact that
S`1+1→[1:`1] is a function of W`1+1; (g) follows from the
fact that H(W`+1, S`1+1→[1:`1])+H(U
(`1,`1), S`1+1→[1:`1]) ≥
H(S`1+1→[1:`1]) +H(U
(`1+1,`1+1),S`1+1→[1:`1]) due to sub-
modularity; (i) follows from (22) in Proposition 2; (j) follows
from the fact that Td,d,`1+1 = Td,d,`+1 + Td,`+1,`1+1; (k)
follows from the facts that Td,`+1,`1+1β ≥ S→[`1+2:`+1]
and (d − `)β ≥ S→`+1; (l) follows from (19) and (27) of
Proposition 1 and 3 respectively; (m) follows from the fact
that Td,d,`+Td,`,`1 = Td,d,`1 . Cancelling
Td,d,`1
+`1
d−` H(U
(`1,`))
from both sides of the inequality and normalizing both sides
by
∑d
t=`+1Bt complete the proof of (9).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper considered the problem of MDC-SR with a
generalized eavesdropping model. It was shown that the MBR
8point of the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-
bandwidth tradeoff region depends on the numbers of type I
and type II compromised storage nodes only via their total, as
long as the number of type I compromised nodes is less than
or equal to the number of type II compromised nodes. Moving
forward, it would be interesting to see whether this result
extends to the entire achievable normalized storage-capacity
repair-bandwidth tradeoff region.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THE EXCHANGE LEMMA II
First note that d − `1 > d − `, so we may write d − `1 =
s(d− `) + r for some integer s ≥ 1 and r ∈ [1 : d− `]. Next, let
at :=

t, t ∈ [1 : `1]
t+ `1, t ∈ [`1 + 1 : `− `1]
t+ j, t ∈ [`− `1 + 1 : d− `].
Finally, let τ0 := {at : t ∈ [1 : r]} and
τq := {at : t ∈ [r + 1 + (q − 1)(d− `) : r + q(d− `)]}
for any q ∈ [1 : s]. It is straightforward to verify that:
• τq ∩ τq′ = ∅ for any q 6= q′;
• ⋃s−1q=0 τq = [1 : `1] ∪ [2`1 + 1 : `];
• τs = [`+ 2 : d+ 1].
Consider a symmetrical (n = d+1, d,N1, . . . , Nd, T, S) code
that satisfies the node regeneration requirement (3). Let us
show by induction that for any p ∈ [1 : s], we have
pH(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
≥ pH(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S`1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−p
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`)).
(31)
To prove the base case of p = 1, first note that
H(U(`1,`)|M(`))
(a)
= H(U(`1,`),W[1:`1]
, S→[`1+1:`]|M
(`))
= H(W[1:`1]
, S→[`1+1:`]|M
(`))
(b)
= H(W[1:`],S→[`1+1:`], S[1:`]→`+1|M
(`))
where (a) follows from the fact that (W[`1:`], S→[`1+1:`]) is a
function of U(`1,`) by Lemma 1, and (b) follows from the fact
that S[1:`]→`+1 is a function of W[1:`]. Furthermore,
H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
(a)
= H(U(`1,`1+1), S→`1+1|M
(`))
= H(W[1:`1]
, S→`1+1|M
(`))
(b)
= H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S→2`1+1|M
(`))
(c)
= H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S→`+1|M(`))
(d)
= H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S[1:`1]→`+1, S[2`1+1:`]→`+1,
S[`+2:d+1]→`+1, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1]|M
(`))
where (a) follows from the fact that S→`1+1 is a function
of U(`1,`1+1) by Lemma 1, and (b) and (c) follow from
the symmetrical code that we consider; (d) follows that
S`+1→[`1+1:2`1] is a function of S→`+1 . It follows that
H(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U`1,`1+1|M(`))
≥ H(W[1:`], S→[`1+1:`], S[1:`]→`+1|M
(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S[1:`1]→`+1, S[2`1:`]→`+1,
S[`+2:d+1]→`+1, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1]|M
(`))
(a)
≥ H(W[1:`], S→[`1+1:`],
S[1:`]→`+1,S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S[1:`1]→`+1, S[2`1:`]→`+1,
S`+1→[`1+1:2`1]|M
(`))
= H(U(`1,`), S→`+1|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−1
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))
= H(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−1
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))
where (a) follows from the submodularity of the entropy
function. This completes the proof of the base case of p = 1.
Assume that (31) holds for some p ∈ [1 : s− 1]. We have
(p+ 1)H(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
= H(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +
(
pH(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
)
≥ H(U(`1,`)|M(`)) + pH(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],S⋃s−p
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`)).
(32)
Note that both S`+1→[`1+1:2`1] and S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
are
functions of W[1:`], which is in turn a function of U
(`1,`) by
Lemma 1. We thus have
H(U(`1,`)|M(`))
= H(U(`1,`), S`+1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`)).
Furthermore, by the symmetrical code that we consider we
have
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−p
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))
= H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],
S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
, S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|M(`)).
It follows that
H(U(`1,`)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],S⋃s−p
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))
= H(U(`1,`), S`+1→[`1+1,2`1], S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],
S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
,S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|M(`))
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≥ H(U(`1,`), S`+1→[`1+1,2`1], S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
,
S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))
= H(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(m))
(33)
where (a) follows from the submodularity of the entropy
function. Substituting (33) into (32) gives
(p+ 1)H(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
≥ (p+ 1)H(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1], S⋃s−(p+1)
q=0 τq→`+1
|M(`))
which completes the induction step and hence the proof of
(31).
Setting p = s in (31), we have
sH(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
≥ sH(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))+
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
,S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],Sτ0→`+1|M
(`))
= sH(U(`1,`+1)|M(`)) +H(W[`1+1:2`1], S`+1→[`1+1:2`1]|M
(`))+
H(Sτ0→`+1|W[`1+1:2`1], S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],M
(`)). (34)
By the symmetrical codes that we consider, we have
H(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1]|M
(`))
= H(W[1:`1]
, S`+1→[1:`1]|M
(`))
= H(W[1:`1]
, S`1+1→[1:`1]|M
(`)) (35)
and
H(Sτ0→`+1|W[`1+1:2`1], S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],M
(`))
= H(Sτ→`+1|W[`1+1:2`1], S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],M
(`))
for any subset τ ⊆ [` + 2 : d + 1] such that |τ | = r. By Han’s
subset inequality [13], we have
H(Sτ0→`+1|W[`1+1:2`1],S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],M
(`))
≥ r
d− `H(S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|W[`1+1:2`1],
S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],M
(`))
≥ r
d− `H(S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|W[`1+1:2`1],
S`+1→[`1+1:2`1],M
(`),U(`1,`))
(a)
=
r
d− `H(S[`+2:d+1]→`+1|U
(`1,`),M(`))
=
r
d− `
(
H(S[`+2:d+1]→`+1,U
(`1,`)|M(`))−
H(U(`1,`)|M(`))
)
=
r
d− `
(
H(U(`1,`+1)|M(`))−H(U(`1,`)|M(`))
)
(36)
where (a) follows from the fact that
(W[`1+1:2`1]
, S`+1→[`1+1:2`1]) is a function of U
(`1,`)
by Lemma 1. Substituting (35) and (36) into (34) gives:(
s+
r
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1+1)|M(`))
≥
(
s+
r
d− `
)
H(U(`1,`+1)|M(`)) +H(U(`1,`1)|M(`))
which is equivalent to (11) by noting that
s+
r
d− ` =
s(d− `) + r
d− ` =
d− `1
d− ` .
This completes the proof of the exchange lemma.
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